

7 November 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** The Director of Central Intelligence

**SUBJECT:** Comments on [REDACTED] Paper 25X1A

Generally, I believe the subject paper is an excellent presentation of the facts insofar as I know them. I believe he is to be complimented for having sorted out and pulled all this material together in such a lucid fashion. It must have been quite a confused picture. The following are a few factual points which I believe should be corrected to keep the record absolutely straight:

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a. Page 12, Paragraph 23, Tenth Line from Bottom - This sentence implies that there was some external directive that the flights should be carried out at [REDACTED] feet. Neither I nor Colonel Ledford know of any such directive. In fact, all missions which the Agency ran over Cuba either before or after September 5 were designed to have maximum altitude over target with the only compensating factor being the requirement for sufficient fuel after coast-out to reach the refueling point or alternate landing field.

b. Page 26, Paragraph 49, Middle - The criteria for launch was Category II (two eighths cloud cover) or better over the critical target areas. In some cases flights were authorized with Category III weather over appreciable parts of the flight.

c. Page 28, Paragraph 53 - Documentation on the presentations made to the Special Group can probably be pulled together if desired. The actual recommendations were really NRO recommendations as opposed to unilateral CIA recommendations. However, these were concurred in by CIA. The primary objective was to cover the suspect NRBH site on the western end of Cuba and at the same time pass over one of the SAM sites which was considered

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**Subject: Comments on [REDACTED] Paper 2**

to be most nearly operational. The coverage of the SAM was not to obtain ECM information for SAC but to determine the operational status of the SAMs in Cuba in order to decide what would be the risk to further U-2 missions which were required to get complete coverage of Cuba as rapidly as possible. The MRRM site area at San Cristobal was not a secondary objective. It was considered at least if not more important than the SAM coverage. I do not believe it was true that the mission would not have flown over San Cristobal if the most likely candidate for an operational SAM site had not been in western Cuba. In fact, the coverage of the SAM site was only desired to see if one could fly with impunity over western Cuba.

d. Page 28, Paragraph 54 - I would suggest deletion of the words "by the President" in the third line since I believe this was a unilateral DOD decision rather than a Presidential decision.

Signed: Herbert Scoville, Jr.

**HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.**  
Deputy Director  
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DDR:HScoville:7713:bb (7 Nov 62)